INTRODUCTION
Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, retired professor of international law at the University of Brasilia, in 1995-2008 judge and Chief Justice of the International Court of Human Rights, was appointed in 2008 to the International Court of Justice for a 9-year term. Since then, he has authored a large number of separate and dissenting opinions concerning verdicts handed down by the Hague-based tribunal 1 . They present a relatively coherent, yet at times controversial picture of international law, with a very strong accent on the role of the individual as the point of reference in the overarching structure of the international law system 2 . This is a conception which Cançado Trindade has been developing for many years 3 , and the presented approach is a characteristic feature of his views. However, it should be emphasized that the manner in which he captures the issue is not entirely unknown to earlier phases in the development of international law jurisprudence 4 . Worthy of particular attention is the consistent manner in which he has constructed a comprehensive approach to the issue under consideration, as well as his efforts at describing the normative reality as a consequence of a humanistic vision of the international legal order; in this vision, the law, including international public law, is a product of some of humanity's lasting aspirations, consistently leaving its mark on the image of public international law. Cançado Trindade emphasizes that this approach to the essence of international law contributes to limiting abuses that affect individuals, as well as grievous violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 5 . This basic theme is repeated throughout a range of variations and explications contained in a series of judicial writings. Absent the acceptance of this fundamental assumption, it would be impossible to maintain the entire conception within an orderly framework. The terminology used to express the OF THE CONCEPTION  OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRESENTED IN OPINIONS OF  JUDGE ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE OF  THE ICJ -FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS   3 assumption adopted by Cançado Trindade is changeable, but its core remains constant. Terms employed such as "universal juridical conscience", "ius necessarium", and "recta ratio" have come to serve as the foundation on which the entire conception is built.
The role of the lawyer in the contemporary world
An interesting aspect from the perspective of the basic conditions underlying the conception discussed here is the criteria related to the role of the lawyer in the contemporary world. Cançado Trindade stresses that the sense of the presented framework will become obvious to the lawyer who, in rejecting modernist and post-modernist traps, achieves the capacity to focus on the needs of the soul 6 . This leads to a particular sort of imperative and the necessity of reflection as sources of understanding the particular role and needs of the individual, including in the normative sense. If this condition is met, there should not be any greater difficulties with accepting the notion that the individual must be the essential point of reference for the international legal order. Even if some would, in the systemic sense, have trouble acknowledging the particular and absolute primacy of the individual over the primary subjectivity of the state, it is difficult not to appreciate the appeal for greater focus and deeper reflection as a condition of action and of the meaning of all conclusions, including legal ones. For Judge Cançado Trindade, the engagement of legal thinking, rejecting to an extent worn pragmatisms, is thus a conditio sine qua non of the construct. It would seem to be a suggestion that the more focused, that is, the more engaged the approach presented by a lawyer, the greater are the chances of that lawyer acknowledging that a logical consequence of general legal consciousness is the understanding that the individual must serve as the overarching category for systematizing the manner in which the international legal order is considered. It should therefore come as no surprise that both the starting point and the final ascertainment is that the lawyer-internationalist's fundamental task is to cement the right of access to justice for all people, in every situation and without regard to the barriers which must be overcome 7 .
Ius necessarium and recta ratio
This assumption, once adopted, leads to further primary elements 8 It would seem that the demand to favour conscience over the intention of a state 9 in a collision with the will of states is primarily a persuasive device. Entities can thus be convinced to re-evaluate their approach to some aspects of international law. Similarly, international judges may engage in the effort to frame the analysed issues to make them aligned with the primary assumptions of the "necessary law" concept, ensuring achievement of the basic objective, which is the superiority of the individual. However, in this case as well it should be kept in mind that the ultimate value of a decision by an international court will depend on the consensual attitudes of parties to the proceedings 10 . Judges may thus employ interpretation to suggest their conviction as to the fairness of the decision. This, however, must be accompanied by conviction on the part of subjects of international law. Without it, ius necessarium remains an imagined collection of ideal principles, an ideal international legal order, a particular appeal or proclamation. There is no other path for it to achieve systemic success. This judicial conviction can assume a posture of demonstrating that only in this manner, with acknowledgement of the primacy of the individual over the state, and of the primacy of humanism over state interest 11 , can we avoid key paradoxes on the way to a comprehensive understanding and application of international law. The key expression in this context is the concept of recta ratio (right reason, right mindfulness) 12 It would seem that a particular path for eliminating the juxtaposition of the will of states with the imperatives of right reason would be acknowledgement that the latter may also be exhibited by representatives of states themselves. In this concept, a judge, a scholar, or the attorney of a state possessed of right mindfulness would thus become a sort of primary source for international law.
Of particular importance would be equating the will of a state with the simple antecedents of right mindfulness.
The "founding fathers" of international law
In developing his conception, Judge Cançado Trindade reaches deeply into the views of the "founding fathers" of international law. Through appropriate selection and configuration, a relatively consistent picture is attained which leads to the conclusion that the effort to understand the international legal order through referencing its whole essence to the individual is a lasting element of that particular legal order. This has accompanied it since the very beginnings of its modern formula, and by the same token it should continue to impact its shape today. This foundation contains the formula presented by F. de Vitoria, according to whom "droit des gens" regulates the international community, comprised of individuals organized socially into states. In addition, we may also identify reference to the views of A. Gentil, who has indicated that the law of nations is law which regulates relations among individuals of a general entity, the community of nations (societas gentium). Cançado Trindade also invokes F. Suarez and his position that a community equated with the concept of humanity requires its own law, a regulator that allows for emphasis of that community's oneness and universality of character. This is only a short distance to the position of Grotius. Cançado Trindade accents his argument that the interest of the state has its natural limits. The state as an organizational form is not a goal in and of itself. Its existence should serve to protect the social order in accordance with the imperatives of right mindfulness, and it should constitute a path for perfecting the community of nations which encompasses all of humanity. Here Trindade reinforces his conception's framework by invoking S. Puffendorf, who claims that the law-giver is obliged to follow the natural law that proceeds from human reason, and the views of C. Wolff that individuals in a particular association with states should strive for materialization of a common good 13 .
<http://ptta.pl/pef/pdf/r/rectaratio.pdf> accessed 07.12.2015. 13 Sep. op., Unilateral Declaration of Independence (n 5) 552, para.
74: The droit des gens regulates an international community constituted of human beings socially organized in States and co-extensive with humankind (F. de Vitoria); thus conceived, it is solely law which regulates the relations among members of the universal societas gentium (A. Gentili). This latter (totus orbis) prevails over the individual will of each State (F. de Vitoria). There is thus a necessary law of nations, and the droit des gens reveals the unity and universality of humankind (F. Suárez). The raison d'Etat has limits, and the State is not an end in itself, but a means to secure the social order pursuant to the right reason, so as to perfect the societas gentium which comprises the whole of humankind (H. Grotius). The legislator is subject to

The Article 38 of the ICJ Statute
One problem with the normative dimension of the conception by Judge Cançado Trindade under discussion here results from the necessity of phrasing it within the legal framework of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. If the Hague tribunal is a court that rules on the basis of international law, all topics undertaken in separate or dissenting opinions concerning the essence of international law and associated legal status of the individual should strive for normative conclusions, as the fundamental objective of a judge is to strive for resolution of a legal dispute on the basis of applicable binding norms. The individual elements of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute therefore establish absolute borders for this reasoning 14 . Naturally, subject to the reservation that under consideration are proceedings effectively initiated before the Hague tribunal. We are therefore dealing with application of the concept of an international agreement, customary law, and general principles of international law acknowledged by civilized nations, as well as supplemental elements taken from international law jurisprudence and adjudication. Only through references to formal sources of international law may we speak of the normative context for the conception of the individual as expressed by Judge Cançado Trindade. Rejecting this framework would, as a consequence, necessitate searching for a separate justification for assessment of the role played by the individual in international law, and by the same token a likely change in the way the essence of international law is perceived.
In accordance with the assumptions adopted, and references to the opinions of the "founding fathers" of international law, Judge Cançado Trindade holds that the proto-source of all law is "the imperative of universal justice", which precedes both the idea of international law and the idea, secondary to it, of the state dimension of this legal order. 15 It would seem that avoidance of a collision between natural law and the primarily positivist tendency in international law is possible in the views of Cançado Trindade through acknowledging that, in present international law, we are dealing with the adoption of a particular legation of natural law in the form of the recta ratio formula, which constitutes an integral and timeless element of the international legal order 16 to acknowledge that there is a rule present in international law which is immanently fixed, and whose validity does not require confirmation being sought in natural-law justifications of the international legal order.
The new universal jus gentium
According to Cançado Trindade, international law boasts a framework helpful in adapting this timeless value of law, and then assists in drawing practical, normative conclusions from it. It would seem that we should first invoke various types of modifications in international law, including the ceaseless efforts to distinguish a particular constant that would comprise a systemic counterweight to the process of fragmentation of international law. In Cançado Trindade's conception, this constant is referred to as the new universal jus gentium of our time, characterized by a far more human dimension. 17 It is directly associated with the process of emancipation of the individual from the power of the state. Cançado Trindade treats this process as a result of the consolidation of international human rights law 18 . In assessing this particular aspect of the conception under discussion, it should be said that, on the one hand, it constitutes a fixed element of the international legal order; on the other, it is an element whose importance is enhanced by transformations and evolution in international law. In this manner, the situational context becomes a factor enhancing the effectiveness of that consolidation. Going further, attention should also be drawn to the previously mentioned enhancement of the process of international law humanization. Cançado Trindade stresses that the rights of the individual should formally be matched with a range of duties incumbent upon states, at a minimum in the form of protection, investigation and prosecution of violations, enforcement of responsibility 19 . The systemic picture of int3ernational law, as captured by Cançado Trindade, takes into account not only the process of humanization, which can impact the manner in which the state is conceived of as a subject of international law, but also several other factors. This category most certainly includes strong invocation of the concepts of "the inherent dignity of the human person", "human conscience", "the universal juridical conscience", which, according to Cançado Trindade, is "the ultimate material source of all law". Among the determinants is also the concept of "realization of justice". In this case as well Cançado Trindade acknowledges that the realization of justice is best served by an environment divorced from voluntarism directed at seeking the consent of the state 20 . This leads to the simple conclusion that within the within the scope of the conception under 17 Cançado Trindade (n 2) 27 et seq. 18 2 discussion, many key phenomena and solutions are justified on grounds other than consensual agreements between states. In consequence, it should come as no surprise that strong emphasis is placed on the right of the individual to "access to justice" 21 . This is a logical extension of the imperative to realize justice. The same can be said about the right of the individual to damages for gross violations of innate human rights 22 . In light of this, there is nothing unusual in the reference by Cançado Trindade to the statement of Dillard contained in the advisory opinion as to the legal status of Western Sahara, that it is for the people to decide what happens with a territory that they inhabit, rather than for the territory to decide what happens with the people who inhabit it 23 . Realizing justice is partially a form of reparations paid to the victim of a crime (here: an individual). For it to be fully realized, access to justice should be multidimensional. Cançado Trindade therefore distinguishes the following: the formal right to initiate proceedings, effective remedies, appropriate procedural guarantees, verdict and its enforcement. These are tools which allow for a full "enforcement" of the rights an individual is afforded within the confined of the international legal order 24 .
The individual as a subject of international law
Interesting from the perspective of the conception's clarity is its direct addressing of the issue of the individual's subjectivity. Cançado Trindade, in addressing the entirety of his considerations, states without hesitation that "individuals are indeed subjects of international law (not merely 'actors')" 25 , with a scope of rights and duties that emanate directly from international law. Cançado Trindade stresses that all attempts to depart from this assumption by international law doctrine would lead to catastrophic results. The subjectivity of the individual is confirmed in a range of international legal norms, comprising international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international refugee law and international criminal law. 26 In light of this, the declaration that, in resolving the disputes brought before it, the International Court of Justice should not focus first on attempting to identify the consent of the states, but rather on striving to realize justice 27 , which in particular cases can prefer the subjectivity of the individual at the cost of states' subjectivity as a result of the greater weight of the values accompanying the individual. What follows is that the realization of justice is directly associated with the need to realize a set of values that demand protection of the individual at the cost of protection of the state 28 . Of course, Cançado Trindade does not reject consent of states as an important criteria helping to bring order to the entirety of international law. However, he applies the concept of presumption to the consent of states. This presumption implies that consent of states can, in some circumstances, be identified with the realization of justice; however, not in every case, as it must at times give way to the requirement of protection for the individual. The imperative for protection of the individual through giving it a particular sort of primacy over the consent of states is a higher-order value; by the same token, in the event of a collision it comprises a fuller realization of justice. Cançado Trindade expressed this presumption in a concise formula from which it results that the consent of states is only a means to an end, and not an objective in and of itself. It does not determine the results of efforts to interpret treaty obligations. In this context, taking the consent of states into consideration is merely a procedural requirement 29 . From the perspective of the primary notion accompanying the conception developed by Judge Cançado Trindade, this manner of capturing the issue is a natural consequence. There is no way to eliminate consent of entities as one of the key elements of reasoning designed to lead to legal conclusions that settle a dispute. However, if consent is merely an instrument, it should only be used as long as it serves the realization of justice, which itself is firstly protection of the individual, not of the state. The state, its will, and the consequences that flow from it should be protected to the extent they serve the protection of the individual, as this is the fundamental objective of the realization of justice.
In support of his reasoning, Cançado Trindade invokes the argument of Grotius that consent can never be treated as the ultimate source of legal obligations. This source can be identified in the formula pacta sunt servanda, treated as a general principle of law 30 . 
"Living instrument"
The fundamental assumption of Judge Cançado Trindade leads to several important solutions in such areas as grasping the essence and the proper interpretation of a treaty. Its final effect is not, perhaps, original, but it does constitute one of the justifications for the application of objective-based interpretation. The justice applies the phrase "living instrument" in reference to treaties. He emphasizes that the constant, hermeneutic search for symptoms of consent of states-parties to a treaty renders it a dead letter. Particularly in reference to treaties concerning human rights protection, the basic approach should place a premium on the need to capture the spirit of such regulation 31 . Here it is worth underlining the obviousness of the fact that treaties addressing international protection of human rights constitute a prime example of this type of regulation. However, Judge Cançado Trindade ultimately extends his opinion to all documents which would essentially provide responses to the needs of the international community, and to the new challenges facing it 32 . In somewhat generalizing the thinking of Cançado Trindade, it should be noted here that the most deserving of the label "living document" and accompanying functional and objective-based interpretative imperatives are those international contracts whose substance renders them clear examples of the realization of justice, in the sense of their achieving the fullest possible degree of protection for the rights and freedoms of the individual.
General principles of international law (prima principia)
A characteristic feature of the entire conception is the strong accent placed on the sphere of values. In this approach, international law constitutes a type of guarantee for the realization of those values. They serve to protect the international community as a whole, rather than individual states 33 . These values are expressed in the general principles of international law, which weld together the entire international law system and ensure it achieves an essential level of cohesion. They are interwoven with the fundamental assumptions of the international legal order, thus imbuing it with the characteristic of universality, which, in turn, constitutes a source of benefits for humanity in general 34 . Judge Cançado Trindade perceives the source of these rules in "human conscience", a general legal awareness, which evolve into the final, substantive source of all law, including the international legal order 35 . From this perspective it is difficult to determine unequivocally whether the source of general principles as understood by Cançado Trindade is located within the system, or whether they are drawn from outside the sphere of the international legal order 36 . It would result from the conception under discussion that they constitute a shared and immanent characteristic of all legal orders. Without them, as Cançado Trindade stresses, there would be no legal order 37 . Constituting a counterweight to legal positivism 38 , they impact the interpretation of specific norms and verify their applicability 39 . In conjunction with the general principles of law, Cançado Trindade returns to ius necessarium, the essential substrate of every legal order that extends beyond a voluntarist justification for the binding force of legal norms 40 . According to Cançado Trindade, exploration of general principals facilitates identification of the values which support the perception of equity and of justice, demonstrating their full worth only in conjunction with the need for protection of the individual 41 . This is a state of "objective justice", which flows from general, fundamental principles (prima principia). It should be emphasized that in this presentation the will of states is therefore incapable of overcoming objective justice; it must submit itself to that justice, acknowledging the supremacy of higher, humanist values which constitute an integral element of the international legal order, co-creating the source of general principles. Thus, justification for the binding force of general legal principles within the confines of the international legal order would be their association with the sphere of values which are appropriate for and characteristic of every legal order, not a sort of generalization and common denominator for all particular norms existing in international law.
inform and conform to their norms. It is the principles (derived etymologically from the Latin principium) that, evoking the first causes, sources or origins of the norms and rules, confer cohesion, coherence and legitimacy upon the legal norms and the legal system as a whole. It is the general principles of law (prima principia) which confer to the legal order (both national and international) its ineluctable axiological dimension; it is they that reveal the values which inspire the whole legal order and which, ultimately, provide its foundations themselves. This is how
Judge Cançado Trindade formulates a catalogue of general principles serving as a tool for the realization of objective justice, which attains its fullest dimension at the moment of protection of human conscience. He includes in them the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination, the principle of procedural equality (equality of arms), the principle of humanism (humanity), itself constituting a generalization of international human rights and international humanitarian law, the principle of dignity of the human person, and a range of general principles of international law listed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations 42 . Cançado Trindade explicitly excludes the principle of state consent from the scope of general principles of law (prima principia) 43 , which is a consequence of the assumption adopted earlier that consent is encompassed only by the presumption of expression of fundamental values that bring order to international law and allow for the realization of justice. It would seem that in this manner Cançado Trindade is attempting to remain formally within the confines of positive law, particularly when invoking the necessity of judicial resolution of international disputes. 9. Ius cogens A characteristic element in the conception developed by Judge Cançado Trindade is linking the legal status of the individual with the necessity of realizing justice through the medium of general principles of law, of which a portion is characterized as ius cogens, unconditionally binding law. The primary objective of international law is to realize justice in a manner that guarantees the greatest possible extent of protection to the individual. Its tools are the general principles of law, which express values fundamental from the perspective of the elementary purpose of the international legal order 44 . An aspect which strengthens the capacity to achieve the assumed objective is imperativeness, especially of the fundamental principle determining every legal order. According to Cançado Trindade, the characteristic of iuris cogentis should be linked with the imperative of the realization of justice. 45 It remains an open question whether this attribute should be applied to all consequences that proceed from this meta-principle. 46 From the opinions expressed, we may observe the conclusion that ius cogens should doubtlessly be comprised of those general principles which express the highest values shared by the international community as a whole. result", and not only "obligations of means and conduct" 48 . It is obvious that the adoption of this perspective strengthens the effectiveness of the conception. To expand, it is also not directly dependent on the consent of states, as it proceeds from meta-norms and the necessity to realize justice. The rule of state consent can strengthen this effect, but in this case it does not meet all of the criteria for a sine qua non condition.
of equality of arms (égalité des armes -at procedural law level). Fundamental principle is, furthermore, that of humanity (permeating the whole corpus juris of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international refugee law). Fundamental principle is, moreover, that of the dignity of the human person (laying a foundation of international human rights law
State immunity
The construction of ius cogens in conjunction with grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law allows Judge Cançado Trindade to explore aspects associated with the responsibility of the state towards the individual, and as a consequence the need to limit state immunity, if that immunity were to constitute a barrier to the realization of a constant feature in every legal order; this feature is referred to in the analysed conception as "rectitude" 49 . The views of Cançado Trindade on the legal character of state immunity are unambiguous. It cannot in any case constitute an element of an understanding which would weaken the imperative for the full realization of justice, particularly if that imperative were to revolve around the traditional necessity expressed in the conception of Cançado Trindade to secure justice for the victims of lawlessness. In his separate opinion entered into the advisory opinion concerning Kosovo's declaration of independence, the ICJ Judge left no doubt as to the scope of impact of unconditionally binding law on the extent to which a state's defence of immunity is effective. According to Cançado Trindade, an unconditionally binding norm which has as its object protection of the individual against all forms of grave lawlessness towards it enjoys superiority over the privileges and prerogatives comprising the institution of state immunity, most of all the immunity of the state and the possibility to engage in "denial of justice" 50 . Two elements are worthy of note in the reasoning presented herein. First, the protection that proceeds from state immunity may not draw on the necessity of protecting the interests of the state when it commits an offence against its own people, or the people of another state 51 52 . The acceptance of this assumption leads in an obvious fashion to the next conclusion that in the event of a grave violation of human rights or international humanitarian law, the individual must be afforded access to justice at the international level, and this law must be enforceable against the applicant's home state without recourse to various measures preventing the realization of justice in its simplest forms 53 . In the formal sphere, Judge Cançado Trindade reinforces the effectiveness of his reasoning through invoking the concepts of customary international law and the fundamental general principle of law, which are serve as primary sources of influence strengthening the individual's position vis a vis the state 54 . To help us comprehend the absolute necessity of such an understanding of the relationship between the state and the individual, Cançado Trindade invokes the potential legal absurdity that may result from revoking the immunity of states in some areas, such as international diplomatic and consular law, while retaining full immunity in the face of charges of grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law 55 . All of these aspects reviewed in concert allow Judge Cançado Trindade to declare unequivocally that, in international law, state immunity does not apply in respect of international crimes, nor grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 56 .
The main function of a state
A particular explication of the conclusion concerning withdrawal of state immunity in conjunction with a state being accused of committing an international crime or grave violation of human rights is a detailing of the scope of dependencies between the principle of territorial integrity and the principle of national self-determination. As Cançado Trindade emphasizes, the invocation of territorial integrity cannot serve as a veil behind which a state can commit international crimes and shield itself from an injured party or group 57 . Of key importance in his opinion is therefore acceptance of a [Vol 5:2 formula which leads to the conclusion that destruction of humanity is not a function of the state. The state, as an institution, exists for the individual, and not the individual for the state 58 . The wisdom of this conclusion is rather uncontroversial. Its detailing, however, can serve as an instrument leading to what are, at times, controversial solutions. Cançado Trindade claims that the government of a state which systematically and gravely violates the human rights of its own citizens or other groups of people thereby loses the right to represent them. In consequence, it should be added, it also loses the right to exist, as the sense of its being boils down to securing the status of the individual 59 . It should be states clearly that associated over-interpretations, mistaken estimations of the systematic and grave nature of violations, or invocations of institutions regarding humanitarian intervention can easily be abused and lead to charges of interference in the internal affairs of other states 60 .
CONCLUSION
In the judicial reasoning of Cançado Trindade, within the confines of the international legal order the individual is afforded the dimension it deserves, once account is taken of a range of components. There are references to both natural law and positivist frameworks invoked. The significance of their combination with each other emerges as only in concert can they facilitate reasoning leading to legally correct resolutions in international disputes concerning the status of the individual. Thus it is inevitable that the conception under discussion fulfils the requirements applied to a legal norm, insofar as it is to serve as the frame of reference for issuing a verdict.
The following elements comprise the determinants of the conception of the individual, repeated in individual and separate opinions delivered at the ICJ by Judge: a) in issuing a verdict, a judge must invoke the essence of the legal order, b) the essence of every legal system, and an essential characteristic of it, is the imperative of the realization of justice, c) the source of the imperative of the realization of justice is rectitude, ratio recta, which carries natural-law connotations, d) law which serves the realization of justice is necessary law (ius necessarium), e) all of the aforementioned elements are equally applicable to international law, f) ius necessarium is superior to ius voluntarium to the extent it is of 60 For example, the arguments raised by Russia in its conflict with Ukraine, that the Ukrainian state had lose its sovereign rights to the Crimea (incapacity to represent the people inhabiting that territory), inter alia with a view to the intensity and character of suggested human rights abuses. OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRESENTED IN OPINIONS OF  JUDGE ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE OF  THE ICJ -FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS   17 greater service in effecting the realization of justice; in this sense, ius necessarium is of greater importance than the will of particular states, g) a presumption obliges that ius voluntarium is compliant with ius necessarium; this is, however, a presumption iuris tantum, h) ius necessarium co-creates the law of the international community, which is composed of individuals organized socially within the framework of states co-existing with humanity per se, i) the law of the international community is a new ius gentium, j) the subjects of the new iuris gentium are thus individuals, as the sense of realizing justice amounts to affording justice to the individual; there is therefore a general directive in effect of pro persone humane, k) the source of the directive of pro persone humanae is a range of general principles of (international) law of an evaluative character; it is sometimes reinforced with the institution of customary international law, l) formal reinforcement of key values for ius necessarium is preformed through the construction of iuris cogentis (peremptory norms); m) systemic interpretation of international law taking into account ius necessarium expressed through unconditionally binding law leads to the appropriate hierarchization of international law norms, n) the hierarchization of international law norms as described above can lead to significant re-evaluations; one of the necessary conclusions is acceptance of weakening the institution of state immunity, if this is a path leading to the realization of justice for an individual harmed by the state; o) the entirety of the conception constitutes a proposal for a new narrative, while retaining the fundamental elements of the legal framework presently in effect 61 .
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